It is doubtful whether this maneuver is anything more than a verbal ploy. The physical world is, according to Berkeley, dependent on and only perceived through a mental state.
Kant, for example, treated space and time in his Transcendental Aesthetic as things that should be explained by a single, unified theory. Both these constitution problems turn on questions about the identities of spatially coincident objects—and, indeed, of objects that share all their proper parts.
The second kind of modality de re concerns the properties of things. Henri Bergson defended free will in his dissertation Time and Free Will from To say that A caused B means that if A had not happened then B would not have happened.
The various dualistic theories of the mind treat the interaction problem in different ways. What then is meant by space and time such that it can serve this function as a ground for objects? It therefore more or less deforms the property by the extension which it gives to it.